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MAZZONE V STATE:
THE MARITAL PRIVILEGE UNBOUND
Philip S. Jackson
Unlike an earthquake, where the aftershocks are often
pale imitations of the original tectonic surge, the effect of an
appellate opinion can only be truly measured by its own
"aftershock." With but little fanfare, the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland in Mazzone v. State,' reversed the
conviction of the leader of a suburban Baltimore County
narcotics conspiracy where police officers intercepted, and
prosecutors used in evidence, the wiretapped telephone con-
versations of a husband and wife carried on in furtherance of
the conspiracy. The initial ripple created by Mazzone was
slight. At first, most members of the defense bar and
prosecutors assumed the exclusionary holding of Mazzone
confined itself to those instances where wiretapped husband/
wife communications were sought to be used in evidence.
However, on closer inspection, Mazzone's aftershock is
proving far more profound and, from a prosecution perspec-
tive, far more cataclysmic than the relatively minor stir it
originally caused.
Roland Mazzone was the manager of a bar/restaurant in
Baltimore County, Maryland. Baltimore County narcotics
detectives, in league with the Harford County Drug Task
Force, developed Mazzone as a target for their investigation
after a series of wiretaps had led them to believe that
Mazzone was the ultimate Maryland source for cocaine that
had made its way into other suspects' hands. The circuit
court judge who authorized the wiretaps ordered that, in
accordance with Maryland law, officers conducting the
wiretap monitor it in such a way as to minimize the intercep-
tion of communications not otherwise subject to intercep-
tion.2 To facilitate implementation of that aspect of the
wiretap order, the State's Attorney's Office drafted the
customary "Minimization Guidelines." These guidelines
are issued to enable officers monitoring the wiretap to
conform their conduct to the mandate of wiretap order by
outlining the circumstances under which officers may law-
fully listen to telephone conversations as well as the circum-
stances under which they must stop listening. Although
"Minimization Guidelines" are not normally part of the
wiretap order itself, the guidelines in Mazzone were sepa-
rately approved in writing by the judge who issued the
wiretap orders. Ultimately at issue in Mazzone was a
passage in the minimization guidelines which authorized the
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interception of those conversations between Mazzone and his
wife that related to the crime under investigation.
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland found (and
the Attorney General's Office conceded) that, under the
statutory scheme of Maryland wiretap law, even criminally-
related conversations of a husband and wife are privileged
and that a court cannot therefore lawfully authorize neither
the interception of, nor the use of evidence of such conversa-
tions. Having made that concession, the Attorney General's
Office argued that a harmless error analysis should be
employed. The State asserted that only one conversation
between Mazzone and his wife was played before the jury
who had found him guilty. It urged that the weight of this one
piece of evidence was minuscule compared to the mass of
lawfully obtained evidence that had been ushered in against
Mazzone.
The court of special appeals, however, adopted a more
radical stand. It reasoned that precedent requires a strict
compliance standard for statutory preconditions to the law-
ful interception of wiretapped conversations. The court
stated that "[t]o the extent that they merely explain the scope
and conditions of the [wiretap] order, [minimization guide-
lines] are, indeed, implementing provisions. What minimiza-
tion guidelines cannot validly do, however, is authorize
something that the statute prohibits.. ."I On that basis, the
court further held that:
The error may well have been an innocent and
inadvertent one, but its nature and effect was no
different than if it had been in the order itself. It is
for this reason that we conclude that the court erred
in denying the motion to suppress the fruits of the
wiretaps.
4
In sum, the sanction imposed by the Mazzone court was
the suppression of all evidence obtained over the life of the
wiretap, regardless of whether an intercepted conversation
involved the privileged husband/wife communications be-
tween Mazzone and his wife. In the court's view, the flaw in
the minimization guidelines rendered invalid the entire wire-
tap order; it did not matter whether the communications of a
husband and wife were actually intercepted. Taken to its
2
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logical conclusion, Mazzone's holding requires the suppres-
sion of all wiretap evidence of a hypothetical group of
bachelor drug dealers if the attendant minimization guide-
lines would have authorized the interception of privileged
conversations, including those that were never in fact inter-
cepted.
To anyone remotely familiar with the pervasive use of
wiretaps in the investigation of drug traffickers, as well as
other violent offenders, and the universal use of language in
minimization guidelines similar to that found offensive in
Mazzone, that holding
represents a serious set-
back to the successful The marit
prosecution of such dan- in Maryland A
gerous criminals. To
compoundthe frustration both of which
of the law enforcement
community, there are cur- testimonial c
rently manifoldjoint fed- witnesses who
eral/local investigations




thorized wiretap employed minimization guidelines sanc-
tioning what was held unlawful in Mazzone. According to
dicta in United States v. Glasco,5 wiretap evidence obtained
in violation of state wiretap law, notwithstanding its legality
under Title III, would be inadmissible in the federal courts as
well.6 Mazzone's reach apparently extends to at least those
federal criminal cases where evidence was gathered pursuant
to a state wiretap order.
To reach its conclusion, the court of special appeals
made four discrete rulings of law:
(1) Conversations between a husband and wife intercepted
over a wiretap are privileged in nature.7
(2) By enacting section 10-407(d) of the Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article, the legislature intended that such privi-
leged communications could not be lawfully intercepted.8
(3) The minimization guidelines authorized the interception
of such protected conversations, and are therefore flawed.'
(4) That flaw requires suppression of the entirety of the fruits
of the wiretap.' 0
Remarkably, there is not one Maryland appellate case
directly supporting any of these propositions. Mazzone's
conclusions are instead the product of analysis based on
analogy and an attempt to discern the sometimes cryptic
intent of the legislature. Accordingly, it is not surprising that
the law enforcement community finds so much over which to
despair inMazzone. What follows is a dissection of each of
the court's rulings leading to its conclusion.
The Application of the Marital Communication Privilege
to Intercepted Wiretap Communications.
The court's underlying assumption is that the privileged
nature of communications between a husband and wife
intercepted via wiretap render them inadmissible evidence.
Thus, an analysis of the parameters of Maryland's marital
privilege is in order.
The marital privilege in Maryland has two facets, both
of which deal with the testimonial competence of witnesses
who happen to be spouses. The statutory privilege appears
in sections 9-105 and 9-
privilege 106 of Maryland's
Courts and Judicial Pro-
is two facets ceedings Article. Sec-
tion 9-105 reads as fol-
deal with the lows: "One spouse is not
mpetence of competent to disclose anyp mpet en c fconfidential communica-
happen to be tion between the spouses
occurring during their
$es. marriage."" As an ex-
ample of that aspect of
the marital privilege, the privilege can be invoked by a
husband to prevent his wife from testifying against him by
revealing confidential communications that have passed
between them. Additionally, section 9-106 reads: "The
spouse of a person on trial for a crime may not be compelled
to testify as an adverse witness unless the charge involves the
abuse of a child under 18. ''"2 Consequently, a wife can
invoke the privilege to avoid bearing witness against her
husband.
Neither aspect of the privilege addresses marital com-
munications otherwise lawfully intercepted pursuant to a
court order. Both statutory marital privileges appear in the
Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article under the subtitle
"Competence, Compellability and Privilege."'"3 On its face,
the marital privilege has the limited impact of affecting only
the competency of spouses as witnesses, and it is contextu-
ally so placed in Maryland's Annotated Code. The statutes
defining the privilege say nothing about whether communi-
cations between a husband and wife can be received in
evidence by a court if obtained by otherwise lawful means.
This is in accord with the Court of Appeals of Maryland
decision in Coleman v. State,'4 where the court stated that,
"The essence of the privilege is to protect confidences only
... and thereby encourage such communications free from
fear of compulsory disclosure, thus promoting marital har-
mony."' 5I The entire orientation of the privilege, as codified,
is to confine its application to those instances where a spouse
is postured to testify against another spouse. The broad
brush with which the Mazzone court paints the privilege is
not consonant with the privilege's plain language.
As the United States Supreme Court has observed,
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"[tiestimonial exclusionary rules and privileges con-
travene the fundamental principle that the 'public.
.. has a right to every man's evidence.' As such, they
must be strictly construed ... only to the very limited
extent that ... excluding relevant evidence has a
public good transcending the normally predominant
principle of utilizing all rational means for ascer-
taining truth.'
' 6
Following that principle, the Maryland appellate courts have
indicated a preference for narrowly interpreting the marital
privilege.
17
In glossing any statute, "[i]t is elementary that a statute
should be construed according to the ordinary and natural
import of the language used, unless a different meaning is
clearly indicated by its context, without resorting to subtle or
forced interpretation for the purpose of extending or limiting
its operation.' 8 "Where statutory language of a statute is
plain and free from ambiguity and expresses a definite and
sensible meaning, courts are not at liberty to disregard the
natural import of words with a view towards making the
statute express an intention which is different from its plain
meaning."19
Unfortunately, in its analysis, the court in Mazzone
violated these precepts in its strained and unprecedented
interpretation of the marital privilege. Rather than narrowly
interpreting the privilege, the court of special appeals ex-
panded it. Rather than according the statute its clear and
unambiguous meaning, the court of special appeals read
some inarticulate legislative intent into it. In contrast to the
reasoning in Mazzone, the marital privilege protected by
Maryland law simply does not cover those cases where a
marital communication is lawfully obtained by and disclosed
through a third. party.
The Legality of Intercepting Marital Communications.
Assuming for the sake of argument that it is unlawful to
use in evidence or to otherwise disclose privileged marital
communications, one may not rule out the possibility that the
interception of such communications is entirely lawful.
Nonetheless, the decision inMazzone is also premised on the
court's view that section 10-407(d) of the Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article, a provision of the Maryland wiretap
statute, precludes even the interception of legally privileged
communications. In fact, the court characterized the unlaw-
fulness of intercepting marital communications as "the
linchpin" of its ultimate holding that all of the evidence
obtained under the wiretap orders must be suppressed. 20 The
court in Mazzone came to such a conclusion only after a
lengthy discussion of the legislative intent behind the lan-
guage of section 10-407(d). Despite its reasoning, the court
blithely ignored both the plain language of the statute and the
well established axioms of statutory construction set by the
Court of Appeals of Maryland. 2'
Section 10407(d) of the Courts and Judicial Proceed-
ings Article reads as follows: "An otherwise privileged wire,
oral or electronic communication intercepted in accordance
with, or in violation of, the provisions of the subtitle, does not
lose its privileged character. 22 That language appears in a
subsection of a statute titled, "Lawful disclosure or use of
contents of communication." Both contextually and on its
face, 10407(d) speaks only to circumscribing the disclosure
of intercepted privileged communications and carries no
prohibition against the interception of such privileged com-
munications. An appellate court should only try to discern
the intent of the legislature if the language of the statute is
ambiguous. 23 Unfortunately, the court of special appeals has
ignored its own rule of statutory construction in going
beyond the plain and unambiguous language of 10407(d).
Even if legislative intent was relevant, the legislature, in
employing the language of section 10407(d), anticipated
that privileged communications could be lawfully inter-
cepted in accordance with the subtitle governing Maryland
wiretap law, as is evidenced by section 10407(d) itself
which reads, "an otherwise privileged wire, oral or electronic
communication intercepted in accordance with . . . the
provisions of the subtitle, does not lose its privileged charac-
ter. '24 If indeed its finding that 10407(d) precludes the
interception of privileged communication is "the linchpin"
of its holding, then the Mazzone court's flawed analysis of
that issue completely undermines that holding.
The Legality of the Minimization Guidelines. Again,
assuming arguendo that the scope of Maryland's marital
privilege encompasses communications between a husband
and wife intercepted during the course of a court ordered
wiretap and that such communications cannot be lawfully
intercepted, it does not necessarily follow that all communi-
cations between a husband and wife are privileged. There
exists a recognized breed of communications that passes
between a husband and wife to which the privilege does not
extend.
While it is presumed that communications between a
husband and wife are confidential, that presumption can be
rebutted.25 Accordingly, not all communications between a
husband and wife areperse privileged. An example ofa non-
privileged marital communication is a husband's instruction
to his wife to discuss a matter with certain other individuals.
So, for instance, where a husband and wife are involved with
others in a narcotics conspiracy, an intercepted communica-
tion of the husband directing the wife to pay offa supplier of
narcotics would not be privileged. Consequently, the com-
munication could theoretically be lawfully intercepted and
used as evidence.
However, the Mazzone court did not even consider the
potentiality of non-privileged marital communications when
it evaluated the sufficiency of the minimization guidelines.
Without discussion, the court found the minimization guide-
24 - U. Bait. L.F. / 24.3
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lines fatally flawed where the guidelines merely allowed the
interception of conversations between husband and wife that
involved the commission of the crime under investigation.
Although marital communications may be inadmissible evi-
dence, Mazzone represents an unprecedented extension of
Maryland law in that a Maryland appellate court has never
held that all communications between a husband and wife are
privileged. The court in Mazzone erred when, as part of its
rationale, it found, as a matter of law, that law enforcement
officers could never intercept any com-
munications between a husband and wife,
even if a conversation was criminal in
nature. Such a conversation may or may
not be privileged, and that assessment
must be made on a case-by-case basis by
the monitoring officers and a reviewing
court.
The Suppression of the Fruits of the
Entire Wiretap.
Finally, even if marital communica-
tions cannot be lawfully intercepted un-
der any circumstances, minimization
guidelines indicating a contrary view do
not warrant suppression of the entire
wiretap. The fruits of a wiretap can be
suppressed on the basis of either the
Fourth Amendment or the statutory ex-











based its holding on its interpretation of the statutory exclu-
sionary rule. Section 10-405 of the Maryland Courts and
Judicial Proceedings Article reads in whole:
Whenever any wire or oral communication has been
intercepted, no part of the contents of the communi-
cation and no evidence derived therefrom may be
received in evidence in any trial, hearing, or other
proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, de-
partment, officer, agency, regulatory body, legisla-
tive committee, or other authority of this State, or a
political subdivision thereof if the disclosure of that
information would be in violation of this subtitle.
26
Regarding the application of this sanction to the issue of
law enforcement compliance with the statutory minimization
mandate, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has said,
"[o]nce the directives of the statute have been met and a valid
order has been issued, compliance, at least in the area of
minimization of unauthorized communications,. . . can be
judged by a more lenient substantial compliance standard. "'
The court of appeals has further said that "the standard for
compliance with the requirement to minimize is the overall
reasonableness of the totality of the conduct of the monitor-
ing agents in light of the purpose of the wiretap and the
information available to the agents at the time of the intercep-
tion." 28 Finally, the court of special appeals has itself
recognized that "the great weight of authority. . . maintains
that the failure to minimize requires only the suppression of
those conversations which should not have been seized and
not the suppression of those conversations which were
appropriately seized.'"2
Contrary to the above cited precedent, the court in
Mazzone found that the statutory minimization mandate
requires strict compliance, as opposed to
substantial compliance, and that a failure
oits to so comply necessitated the suppres-
sion of all of the intercepted conversa-
tions, as opposed to the suppression of
ressed those conversations which should not
o f have been seized. The incongruity of that
asiS holding is manifest in comparing the fol-
the lowing scenarios. Where a wiretap's
minimization guidelines direct that, in
rth conformity with Mazzone, communica-
I n tions between a husband and wife can
rm ent under no circumstances be intercepted
Se and where an officer monitoring that
wiretap purposefully proceeds to inter-
ory cept non-criminal personal marital com-
munications, the only conversations sub-
ary rule. ject to suppression would be those mari-
tal communications. However, where
the minimization guidelines allow for the
limited interception of crime-related marital communica-
tions, and where no marital communications of any kind are
intercepted or used in evidence, then, according toMazzone,
all calls intercepted over the wiretap must be suppressed.
Under such reasoning, a conscious violation of the minimi-
zation guidelines nets a better result for a law enforcement
agent than a good faith effort to abide by the minimization
guidelines. If "statutes are to be construed reasonably with
reference to the purpose to be accomplished ... and in light
of the evils or mischief sought to be remedied,"30 the court of
special appeals should not have permitted such an illogical
reading of the statutory exclusionary rule of the Maryland
Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance statute.
Alternate Grounds for the Admission of Evidence.
In United States v. Leon,31 the United States Supreme
Court held that evidence need not be suppressed when
obtained through the police's good faith reliance on a facially
valid warrant that is later found lacking in probable cause.
The Court concluded that a "good faith" exception to the
exclusionary rule was proper because suppression of evi-
dence in this situation would not further the deterrent func-
tion of the exclusionary rule. 2
It is now clear that, at least at the federal level, the "good
faith exception" also applies to the statutory exclusionary
rule governing wiretaps.3 In United States v. Donovan,
34
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the Supreme Court stated that "not every failure to comply
fully with any requirement provided in Title III [the Federal
wiretap statute] would render the interception of wire or oral
communications 'unlawful' .... To the contrary, suppres-
sion is required only for those statutory requirements that
directly and substantially implement the congressional inten-
tion to limit the use of intercept procedures to those situations
clearly calling for the employment of this extraordinary
investigative device."35
It is difficult to conceive of a more compelling case for
the application of the "good faith exception" than the
Mazzone case and cases like it. The officers who imple-
mented the minimization guidelines inMazzone were appar-
ently not lawyers. The Office of the Assistant State's
Attorneys from Baltimore County drafted the guidelines.
The drafters had instructed the officers how and when to
intercept telephone conversations, and the officers had a
reasonable basis for relying on those instructions. Further,
those same minimization guidelines were approved by the
issuing judge when he issued the ex-parte wiretap orders; he
had thereby placed his own stamp of approval on the
minimization guidelines, giving the officers every reason to
believe they were acting lawfully. Finally, at the suppression
hearing, yet another circuit court judge found no moment to
find fault with the minimization guidelines.
Prior toMazzone, no Maryland court had ever spoken to
the issue, and most federal jurisdictions followed a rule of
law that would have allowed the interception of marital
communications here assailed.36 The officers were justified
in relying on the minimization guidelines issued by the four
attorneys, two of whom were judges, who had condoned the
interception of crime-related marital communications, and
they had no way of anticipating the holding of the court in
Mazzone. Under such circumstances, the suppression of the
wiretap evidence would wreak a profound injustice. In
accordance with the clear interpretation of both federal and
Maryland law regarding the suppression of wiretapped
communications, the Court of Appeals of Maryland should
revisit the decision in Mazzone and reverse it.37
Endnotes
'98 Md. App. 490, 633 A.2d 918 (1993).
2Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. §10-408(e)(3) (1989 &
Supp. 1993).
3Mazzone, 98 Md. App. at5Ol,633 A.2d at 923. (Emphasis
added).
41d. at 502, 633 A.2d at 923.
5917 F.2d 797 (4th Cir. 1991).
6 d. at 798-99. Title III is the federal wiretap and electronic
surveillance statute, as codified, in 18 U.S.C. §§2510-2521
(1994).
7Mazzone, 98 Md. App. at 495, 633 A.2d at 921.
81d. at 500, 633 A.2d at 922.
91d. at 495, 633 A.2d at 921.
'Old. at 502, 633 A.2d at 923.
"Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. §9-105 (1993).
1
2Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. §9-106 (1993).
3See Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. §§9-101 et seq. (1993).
14281 Md. 538, 380 A.2d 49 (1977).
"5Id. at 541, 380 A.2d at 52 (emphasis added).
1
6Trammelv. US., 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980) (quoting US. v.
Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950) and Elkins v. US., 364
U.S. 206, 234 (1960)).
"See Gutridge v. State, 236 Md. 514,204 A.2d 357 (1964);
Matthews v. State, 89 Md. App. 488, 598 A.2d 813 (1991).
'Coleman, 281 Md. at 546, 380 A.2d at 54 (citing State v.
Fabritz, 276 Md. 416, 421, 348 A.2d 275, 278 (1975)).
'9State v. Fabritz, 276 Md. 416,421-22, 348 A.2d 275,284
(1975) (quoting Gatewood v. State, 244 Md. 609, 617, 224
A.2d 677, 682 (1966)).
2"Mazzone, 98 Md. App. at 497, 633 A.2d at 921.
21See Fabritz, supra note 19.
22Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. §10-407(d) (1993).
2Fabritz, 276 Md. at 421-22, 348 A.2d at 284.
24Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. §10-407(d) (1993).
2'Coleman v. State, 281 Md. 538, 543, 380 A.2d 49, 52
(1977).
26Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. §10-405 (1993).
27Baileyv. State, 289 Md. 143,153-54, 422 A.2d 1021,1027
(1980).
21Speasev. State,275 Md. 88,99,338 A.2d284, 290 (1975).
29Bellv. State, 22 Md. App. 496, 505, 323 A.2d 677, 681-
82 (1975) (emphasis added).
30State v. Fabritz, 276 Md. 416, 421, 348 A.2d 275, 278
(1975) (citations omitted).
31468 U.S. 897 (1984).
3 'The exception also applies when the police obtain evidence
in reliance on a warrant later found technically defective.
Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984).
3318 U.S.C. §2515 (1994). See UnitedStates v. Malekzadeh,
855 F.2d 1492, 1497 (1 th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S.
1029 (1989); United States v. Butz, 982 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir.
1993); and United States v. Aiello, 771 F.2d 621 (2d Cir.
1985).
34429 U.S. 413 (1977).
351d. at 433-34.
36See United States v. Harrelson, 754 F.2d 1153 (5th Cir.
1985);United States v. Neal, 743 F.2d 1441 (10th Cir.
1984); and United States v. Kahn, 471 F.2d 191 (7th Cir.
1972).
37Mazzone v. State is scheduled for oral arguments in the
Court of Appeals of Maryland in September, 1994.
About The Author
Philip S. Jackson is an attorney with the United States
Attorney's Office for the District of Maryland. Mr. Jackson
graduated from the University of Baltimore School of Law
in 1984.
26 - U. Bait. L.F. / 24.3
